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UNIVERSITY OF
COLORADO LAW REVIEW
Volume 58, Number 4 Winter 1988
MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING OF
INDIAN WATER: FROM CONFLICT TO
PRAGMATISM*
DAVID H. GETCHES**
Water remains the most vitally important resource of nearly all
Indian tribes. It is the touchstone of Native American cultures, link-
ing today's and tomorrow's Indians with their early fellow tribesmen
who drank, fished, and drew irrigation water from the same water-
ways.' The might and mystery of rivers-from the Big Horn to the
Colorado, from the Columbia to the Rio Grande-drew the ancients.
Some waters, like the Taos Indians' Blue Lake, were sacred.2 Others,
like the Colorado River at Rainbow Bridge, framed holy places.3 Rev-
erence and understanding for the life-giving propensities of water in-
spired an ethos, often reflected in ceremonies and tabus, of protecting
* A version of this paper was presented at the University of Wyoming College of Law Natural
Resources Law Forum, February 27, 1987.
** Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the research assistance of University of Colorado law students William Brooks, Roe Bubar, and Eliza-
beth Thomas, and thanks Jane W. Gardner, Esq., Assistant Regional Counsel, United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency, for her review of a draft of the paper.
1. One commentator has asserted: "Seize and take from the Indian people, by whatever means,
their life-sustaining Winters doctrine rights to water and you take from them the bases for their contin-
ued existence as a separate and distinct people." Veeder, Indian Water Rights in the Upper Missouri
River Basin, 48 N.D.L. REV. 617, 618 (1972). Frank Tenorio, Governor, San Felipe Pueblo, stated:
There has been a lot said about the sacredness of our land which is our body, and the values
of our culture which is our soul. But water is the blood of our tribes and if its life-giving
flow is stopped, or it is polluted, all else will die and the many thousands of years of our
communal existence will come to an end.
AMERICAN INDIAN RESOURCES INSTITUTE, TRIBAL WATER MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, BUILDING
HOMELANDS ON 19TH CENTURY PROMISES (1987).
2. See Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970) (returning sacred Blue Lake area to Taos Pueblo).
3. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981)
(rejecting claims of Navajo Indians that the filling of Lake Powell and Park Service access policies
would interfere with religious practices centering around Rainbow Bridge).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW
water quality and preventing overexploitation of water-dependent re-
sources.4 When tribes were confined to reservations, water became vi-
tal to their survival there. Some were no longer able to roam and hunt
over vast areas, others were restricted in their traditional fishing op-
portunities. They had to make the most of reservations where much of
the land was barren and dry, and where water for fishing or crop irri-
gation was scarce. It is clear that for centuries Indians have had their
essential needs sustained by the waters available to them. And it is
also clear that the future of Indian reservations as permanent home-
lands depends on water. Indian economic survival today depends on
having enough water for irrigation, industry, and domestic use; on
having water clean enough to sustain fisheries and spiritual needs; and,
indeed, on having the ability to sell water to non-Indians for off-reser-
vation uses.
The vital importance of water to Indian people has frequently
brought them into conflict with non-Indian neighbors. As the non-
Indians sought to develop communities in the arid West, they were led
to the same water sources that Indians claimed. Though water was
also scarce for non-Indians, they were able to create virtual monopo-
lies on some streams because they had access to the capital necessary
to develop water. While conflicts over rights to Indian water have cost
millions of dollars, stymied development, and fomented bitterness, In-
dians have almost invariably prevailed by having courts validate their
rights.5
4. In United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976), the court found that "the taking of fish for ceremonial
and subsistence purposes has a special treaty significance distinct from and superior to the taking of fish
for commercial purposes .... Id. at 343. The decision noted that the "first-salmon" ceremony was
essentially a religious rite to ensure the continued return of salmon. The symbolic acts,
attitudes of respect and reverence, and concern for the salmon reflected a ritualistic concep-
tion of the interdependence and relatedness of all living things which was a dominant fea-
ture of native Indian world views. Religious attitudes and rites insured that salmon were
never wantonly wasted and that water pollution was not permitted during the salmon
season.
Id. at 351. In United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905), the Supreme Court recognized that
fish were "not much less necessary to the existence of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed."
See also Wilkinson & Conner, The Law ofthe Pacific Salmon Fishery: Conservation and Allocation of a
Transboundary Common Property Resource, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 17, 26 n.40 (1983); Note, The Envi-
ronmental Right to Habitat Protection: A Sohappy Solution, 61 WASH. L. REV. 731, 741-42 (1986).
5. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) (the reserved rights of the United States
extend to Indian reservations); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) (creation of an Indian reser-
vation implies that the United States and the tribe reserved rights to sufficient water to fulfill reservation
purposes; quantity of water reserved to meet present and future needs of reservations established for
agricultural uses determined by extent of practicably irrigable acreage); and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (1973) (United States must protect the tribe's water rights, and
the operation of competing reclamation project by the federal government was not consistent with its
fiduciary duty owed to the tribe). Not all courts have recognized Indians as having the full quantity of
[Vol. 58
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The ultimate water problem facing most Indian tribes is not
whether they have water rights, but whether water will be available
when they are ready to use it. Part of the problem is that non-Indian
uses have commenced and are regulated under state laws designed to
secure and protect those uses in the future., Equities favoring non-
Indians may be difficult to disturb later. Declining water quality also
threatens to limit the future uses and value of water. This article will
look at how tribes can address both of these problems. Wise regula-
tion of water allocation and water quality can expand and enhance the
benefits that a tribe enjoys from its resources.
With scores of complicated, expensive and inconclusive lawsuits
to prove and quantify Indian reserved water rights raging throughout
the West, federal, state and tribal officials and policy makers are begin-
ning to focus their attention on the management and marketing of In-
dian water.6 It is timely and appropriate to supplant some of the legal
combat over the existence and quantification of Indian water rights
with practical questions of how best to use the water secured by those
rights. Indians and non-Indians alike are realizing that hard-fought
quantifications of Indian water rights produce only partial, often theo-
retical answers, prolonging the uncertainties that disserve both
groups.7 Furthermore, the West is generally turning to better manage-
ment of water resources and market transactions as answers to water
supply problems.8
rights they have claimed. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983) (United States cannot claim
water rights additional to the reservation's previously decreed rights).
6. See J. Thorson, Resolving Conflicts Through Intergovernmental Agreements. The Pros and Cons
of Negotiated Settlements, in INDIAN WATER 1985, at 31 (C. Miklas & S. Shupe eds. 1986). At least 50
Indian reserved water rights suits are pending. Most have been in progress for several years. Those
that have reached judgment leave many issues unsettled. See infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
The trend toward dealing with practical concerns is discussed in Shupe, Water in Indian Country.- From
Paper Rights to a Managed Resource, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 561 (1981). See also J. Folk-Williams, State
and Indian Governments.- Are New Relationships Regarding Water Possible? in INDIAN WATER 1985 (C.
Miklas & S. Shupe eds. 1986).
7. See Shupe, supra note 6, at 562-69; Clyde, Special Considerations Involving Indian Rights, 8
NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 237 (1975).
The Public Land Law Review Commission said that "the uncertainty generated by the [reserved
rights] doctrine is an impediment to sound planning for future water resources development." PUBLIC
LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 144 (1970).
8. WATER EFFICIENCY TASK FORCE, REPORT TO THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, WEST-
ERN WATER: TUNING THE SYSTEM (1986) (finding that states should establish water use efficiency as a
goal of water policy and encourage and implement comprehensive water transfer, conservation and
salvage programs); STATE OF CALIFORNIA, FINAL REPORT, GOVERNOR'S COMM'N TO REVIEW CALI-
FORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW 71-72 (1978) (recommending measures to increase efficiency of water
use). See also Tarlock, The Changing Meaning of Water Conservation in the West, 66 NEB. L. REV. 145
(1987); Wilkinson, Western Water Law in Transition, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 317 (1985); Shupe, Waste in
Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61 OR. L. REV. 483 (1982); WATER AND AGRICULTURE
IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES: CONSERVATION, REALLOCATION AND MARKETS (G. Weatherford
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Massive federal statutes creating pollution control schemes have
acknowledged tribes as sovereigns, offering them the opportunity to
take over implementation of complex statutes on their reservations.
These laws challenge tribes to develop the technology and staffing
needed to administer and enforce elaborate water quality regulation
and improvement programs. Tribal governments must decide whether
to take responsibility for such programs and, if they do, whether to
implement them entirely through tribal agencies or in conjunction
with state and federal governments. The decision implicates policy
issues and practical questions of cost and technical capability.
Finally, some tribes are considering marketing as a means for re-
alizing the economic benefits of their water. Indians have long de-
spaired of sufficient capital to put their apparently formidable water
rights to use. Even when courts or settlement agreements announce
the quantities to which they are entitled, Indians remain unable to use
their water. It is often impractical or undesirable to expand existing
water uses or institute new uses. Agriculture has been the predomi-
nant use of water on most Indian reservations,9 yet expanding produc-
tion of agricultural commodities is a losing proposition most places in
the country. Many industrial uses of water require a heavy commit-
ment of capital that simply is unavailable. Some new uses may result
in degradation of water sources by pollution that could offend impor-
tant existing uses such as fishing and domestic consumption. These
effects could be unacceptable to Indians. One answer to these
problems is for tribes to sell or lease rights to use water to others
within or outside their reservations. While there are limited markets
for Indian water today, the ability to sell or lease it can spur water and
economic development planning between Indian and non-Indian
governments.
Non-Indian water users face problems similar to those of Indian
tribes. Traditional uses such as agriculture are no longer economically
justified.' ° Federal funds are not available to develop new water
sources because the once-great willingness and ability of the federal
ed. 1982); Kramer & Turner, Prevention of Waste or Unreasonable Use of Water. The California Experi-
ence, 1 AGRIC. L.J. 519 (1980).
9. Collins, The Future Course of the Winters Doctrine, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 481 (1985). Collins
states that while the largest share of Indian water rights are defined by irrigation, Indians will want to
use that water for different purposes as irrigated agriculture declines.
10. The relative importance of agriculture in the West is decreasing. See Abbey, Energy Produc-
tion and Water Resources in the Colorado River Basin, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 275 (1979), and Getches,
Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 427-31 (1985). As municipal
and industrial uses expand, the farmer's opportunity cost of keeping the water for agricultural uses will
increase, and make it advantageous for farmers to sell water rights for the higher valued use.
[Vol. 58
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government to finance water projects has ended." Project develop-
ment is also inhibited by widely-shared environmental concerns and a
new consciousness of the economic and social value of instream uses
such as recreation and wildlife.' 2 The states' diminished inclination
and ability to develop new sources of water have motivated their
search for better management techniques so that they can make more
productive use of existing resources.13 States and tribes alike struggle
with the question of how best to carry out the mandate and purposes
of federal water quality laws.
Uncertain Quantity
The United States Supreme Court held in 1908 that Indians had
an implied right to waters sufficient to fulfill the purposes of reserving
their lands. In Winters v. United States14 the Court said that while
treaties were silent on the question of water,
it would be extreme to believe that . . . Congress destroyed the
reservation [by letting others appropriate the water] and took from
the Indians the consideration of their grant, leaving them a barren
waste-took from them the means of continuing their old habits,
yet did not leave them the power to change to new ones.15
The same logic led the Supreme Court, half a century later, to
award the right to nearly a million acre-feet to tribes along the Colo-
rado River.' 6 It held that this was the quantity of water needed to
irrigate all the "practicably irrigable acreage" on the five reservations,
a standard based on a finding that the reservations had been set aside
for agricultural purposes. In support of its holding that water rights
were impliedly created, the Court observed that:
it is impossible to believe that when Congress created the great
Colorado River Indian Reservation and when the Executive De-
partment of this Nation created the other reservations they were
11. See Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 325, and P. FRADKIN, A RIVER No MORE 11-12 (1981). The
federally authorized water projects that remain to be built are difficult to justify economically and
practically. One deterrent is that the already authorized projects that have not been built would not
directly benefit large numbers of people. For instance, the Savery-Pot Hook project in Colorado and
Wyoming, that is authorized but unfunded, would irrigate only 14,650 acres, but would inundate
21,750 acres of grazing land and would cost approximately $700,000 for each ranch served.
12. See generally Wilkinson, supra note 8; R. WALSH, L. SANDERS & J. LOOMIS, WILD AND
SCENIC RIVER ECONOMICS: RECREATION USE AND PRESENTATION VALUES 71-73 (1985) (concluding
based on a survey that the Colorado public is willing to pay substantial amounts of money to preserve
many rivers in their wild condition).
13. See supra note 8.
14. 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
15. Id. at 577.
16. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
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unaware that most of the lands were of the desert kind-hot,
scorching sands-and that water from the river would be essential
to the life of the Indian people and to the animals they hunted and
the crops they raised.
17
Solicitude in the noble language of Supreme Court decisions has
not slaked the thirst of Indian Country. Reservation lands remain
dry, unproductive, and underdeveloped. Yet states and their citizens
are hostile to a reserved rights doctrine that casts a "cloud" over state-
created water rights and thus impedes investment and represses prop-
erty values.' I Non-Indians have nevertheless received some satisfac-
tion from these clouded water rights, simply by having the means to
develop them, means often provided by federal largess. Furthermore,
state legal regimes have been intensively administered to put waters to
their fullest use, often leaving little available to Indians for future
needs.' 9 Indians have watched reservation streamflows dwindle, as
waters to which they hold a potent legal claim are swallowed up by
their neighbors. The National Water Commission observed in 1973
that:
Following Winters .... the United States was pursuing a policy of
encouraging the settlement of the West and the creation of family-
sized farms on its arid lands. In retrospect, it can be seen that this
policy was pursued with little or no regard for Indian water rights
and the Winters doctrine. With the encouragement, or at least the
cooperation, of the Secretary of the Interior-the very office en-
trusted with the protection of all Indian rights-many large irriga-
tion projects were constructed on streams that flowed through or
bordered Indian Reservations, sometimes above and more often
below the Reservations. With few exceptions the projects were
planned and built by the Federal Government without any attempt
to define, let alone protect, prior rights that Indian tribes might
have had in the waters used for the projects .... In the history of
the United States Government's treatment of Indian tribes, its fail-
ure to protect Indian water rights for use on the Reservations it set
aside for them is one of the sorrier chapters.20
For over a decade many have seen the quantification of Indian
17. Id. at 598-99.
18. See Laird, Water Rights: The Winters Cloud over the Rockies. Indian Water Rights and the
Development of Western Energy Resources, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 155 (1979). See generally Ognibene,
Indian Water Rights Clouding Plans for West's Economic Development, 44 ENVTL. REP. 1841 (1982).
19. See Fellhauer v. People, 167 Colo. 320, 447 P.2d 986 (1968) (there shall be "maximum utiliza-
tion" of the water of the state); Collins, Indian Allotment Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV.
421, 427 (1985); and Wilkinson, supra note 8, at 325.
20. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE - FINAL REPORT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 474-75 (1973).
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reserved rights as the best way to remove (or at least limit) clouds on
non-Indian rights and to do justice to reservation Indians. Unfortu-
nately, litigation over Indian rights has proved to be a circuitous and
hazard-strewn route to those ends. It took Colorado fifteen years and
four cases in the United States Supreme Court to establish that under
a federal law consenting to joinder of the United States in state court
water rights adjudications (the "McCarran Amendment"21), the
proper forum for such quantifications was in Colorado state courts.22
Not until after several United States Court of Appeals decisions and
another Supreme Court decision was it clear that under the McCarran
Amendment adjudication of Indian water rights is properly vested in
the state courts of other states.23 Once in the proper forum, the parties
have found that the costs of these quantification cases are staggering.
Legal fees and the costs of expert witnesses run into the tens of mil-
lions of dollars for a single adjudication. 24  Delays of many years pre-
cede a decision, 25 and although such a decision may be called "final,"
it may be only the beginning of years of conflict and further litigation
or negotiation over its meaning.
The epic litigation of the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe's rights in
Nevada, where seventy-five years of legal activity has failed to provide
certainty for Indians or non-Indians, is an extreme but not isolated
example.2 6 Protracted litigation is rarely in the interests of litigants,
21. 43 U.S.C. § 666 (1982).
22. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United States
v. Akin, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 527 (1971); United States v.
District Court (Eagle County), 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
23. Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1985); Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit,
668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982); San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Arizona, 668 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1982);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1979).
24. See, e.g., In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River
System and All Other Sources, Civil No. 4993 (Wyo. Dist. Ct. May 10, 1983), modified, No. 101-234
(Wyo. Dist. Ct. June 8, 1984). This general adjudication to quantify water rights for the Wind River
Indian Reservation cost the State of Wyoming an estimated $7.2 million. WESTERN WATER STATES
COUNCIL, STUDY PREPARED FOR THE WESTERN GOVERNORS' ASS'N, INDIAN WATER RIGHTS IN
THE WEST 98 (1984). After the decision, legal costs continued to accrue as the matter was appealed
and its interpretations were negotiated and litigated.
25. The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963), was
handed down 16 years after the case was filed. In Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419 (1979), a supple-
mental decree was entered identifying additional perfected rights. In Arizona v. California, 460 U.S.
605 (1983), the United States and the tribes were seeking to have the water rights apportioned in the
1963 case increased to account for: (I) irrigable lands within the reservations' boundaries which had
not been claimed in the earlier case; and (2) irrigable lands that were subsequently determined to lie
within the reservations. The Court held that the prior determination of Indian water rights precludes
relitigation of irrigable acreage based on miscalculations and problems in federal representation of the
tribes, but that expanded quantities based on later boundaries could be decided, as this was in accord-
ance with the earlier decree.
26. In 1913, the United States, representing both the Pyramid Lake Indian Reservation and the
planned Newlands Reclamation Project, brought suit to adjudicate water rights to the Truckee River.
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but it may sometimes serve the interests of one of them. The Escon-
dido Mutual Water District litigation, involving several Mission In-
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., Equity No. 3 (D. Nev., filed 1913). Thirty-one years later, the
United States District Court of Nevada entered a final decree, pursuant to a settlement agreement.
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., (Orr Ditch) Equity No. A-3, Final Decree 87 (D. Nev. 1944).
Because of its concern for a lack of water to maintain the level of Pyramid Lake, the heart of its
reservation, the tribe in 1970 sought to intervene in a quiet title action for water rights in the Carson
River that originated in i925. The motion was denied by the court, holding that the tribe had no
interest in the Carson River, although the Truckee and Carson Rivers were jointly operated and the
tribe had water rights in the Truckee River. United States v. Alpine Land and Reservoir Co., 431 F.2d
763 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
For many years the tribe complained to federal officials that Pyramid Lake's level was falling
steadily due to non-Indian water use from the Truckee River, the lake's only tributary. Finally, the
United States filed a petition in the Supreme Court in 1972 invoking the Court's original jurisdiction to
determine the respective rights of California, Nevada and the United States in the Truckee River. The
United States sought rights to sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the Pyramid Lake Reservation
"including the maintenance and preservation of Pyramid Lake and the maintenance of the lower ...
Truckee as a natural spawning ground for fish and other purposes beneficial to and satisfying the
needs" of the tribe (United States v. Nevada, No. 59 Orig., Oct. Term (1972), complaint at 14). The
Court declined jurisdiction, saying the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the district court. 412 U.S.
534 (1972). In the same year, the tribe brought an action challenging the Secretary of the Interior's
actions in allowing Pyramid Lake's level to fall more than seventy feet, endangering the fishery on
which they depended for their livelihoods. The tribe argued that the Secretary's regulations allowed
delivery of more water to the Truckee-Carson Irrigation District than required by applicable decrees
and statutes and thereby diverted water that would otherwise flow to Pyramid Lake. The tribe argued
that the regulation was inconsistent with the Secretary's trust obligation to the tribe and was arbitrary,
capricious and an abuse of discretion. The court held that all water not under decree or contract to the
irrigation district must be allowed to flow into the lake. It then ordered adoption of a modified version
of proposed regulations submitted by the tribe. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354
F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1973).
The court awarded the tribe attorney's fees and expenses of more than $106,000 (Pyramid Lake
Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 360 F. Supp. 669 (D.D.C. 1973)) but the appellate court reversed (Pyramid
Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975)).
Subsequently, the irrigation district intentionally violated the regulations by diverting more water than
permitted. The Secretary terminated the contract that allowed the irrigation district to operate the
Newlands Reclamation Project, after which the district brought a suit against the Secretary in which
the tribe intervened. The court upheld the Secretary's actions. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist. v. Sec-
retary of Dept. of Interior, 742 F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985). In a
related action brought by the Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District, to compel water sales from
Stampede Reservoir on the Truckee River, the tribe intervened. The Ninth Circuit reversed in part the
district court (Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Dist. v. Watt, 537 F. Supp. 106 (D. Nev. 1982))
holding that the Secretary is not required to sell any excess water for consumptive uses after fulfilling
obligations under the tribe's reserved water rights and the Endangered Species Act. Carson-Truckee
Water Conservancy Dist. v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1083 (1985).
The tribe continues to participate in proceedings to enforce the Endangered Species Act as a means of
securing a greater allocation of water to Pyramid Lake and its fishery.
In 1973, the United States brought a general stream adjudication against some 21,000 water users
on the river system, asserting a reserved water right to fulfill the purposes of the Pyramid Lake Reser-
vation. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the claim could be brought against the Truckee-
Carson Irrigation District, but not against parties whose rights were adjudicated in the 1944 Orr Ditch
decree. United States v. Truckee-Carson Irrigation Dist., 649 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1981), amended, 666
F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1982).
The United States Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that all parties below were bound by
the Orr Ditch decree, which was, at the time it was brought, believed to be a "comprehensive adjudica-
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dian bands in a valley outside San Diego, California, has been going on
since 1969.27 A few years ago, the water users involved in the case
admitted that it was cheaper for them to spend hundreds of thousands
of dollars for attorneys' fees and litigation costs than it would be to
pay to replace the water they would lose in a settlement or judgment. 28
At last, however, a settlement is being reached that will presumably be
to the benefit of both Indians and non-Indians.
Parties to Indian water rights disputes are increasingly attempt-
ing to negotiate settlements.29 Settlement negotiations, like litigation,
are costly and time consuming because they usually require hiring ex-
perts and lawyers and preparing technical studies, but they can pro-
duce more flexible and beneficial solutions. Settlement packages can
tion of water rights intended to settle once and for all" the quantity of Truckee River water each party
was entitled to receive. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 143 (1983).
27. Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mutual Water Co., No. CIV. 69-217-S (S.D.
Cal., filed July 25, 1969).
28. Escondido Times Advoc., Sept. 25, 1983, at Al, col. 1. By 1983,-the non-Indian water users
had spent $2 million on legal fees to protect their water supply, while California Indian Legal Services
had expended an estimated $750,000 to fight the suit on behalf of the tribes.
29. In 1978, the Ak-Chin Indian Community agreed to forego substantial water claims against
non-Indians in return for the Secretary of Interior's promise of 85,000 acre-feet of irrigation water.
Pub. L. No. 95-328, 92 Stat. 409 (1978). This water was to be supplied from a federal well field project,
but the wells to be used to supply the Ak-Chin Community threatened to deplete the Papago Reserva-
tion's groundwater supplies. The Department of Interior remedied the problem by renegotiating a
contract with an irrigation district that would allow the district's excess water to be delivered to the Ak-
Chin Community. The agreement was thus amended in 1984. Pub. L. No. 98-530, 98 Stat. 2698
(1984).
In 1982, the San Xavier Band of the Papago Tribe settled its existing and future claims against
groundwater users in the Tucson area. Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1274 (1982). The tribe agreed to
limit its pumping to 10,000 acre-feet per year and to take 37,800 acre-feet of the Central Arizona
Project water for new or improved irrigation projects. Pub. L. No. 97-293, § 307(D), 96 Stat. 1274,
1281 (1982).
In 1985, Montana ratified a water apportionment compact with the Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes
of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation. Fort Peck-Montana Compact, ch. 735, 1985 Mont. Laws (codi-
fied at MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201 (1987)). The compact was negotiated by a nine-member Re-
served Water Rights Compact Commission created in 1979 when Montana enacted its comprehensive
water adjudication statute. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 2-15-212 and 85-2-702 (1983). To the extent the
compact limits, waives or allows marketing of Indian water rights it must be approved by Congress.
See infra notes 142-145 and 162 and accompanying text. It has also been argued that congressional
approval is necessary to make this state-Indian compact binding. Tarlock, One River, Three Sovereigns:
Indian and Interstate Water Rights, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 631, 665 (1987).
This year, after more than fifteen years of litigation, the Mission Indian bands of Southern Califor-
nia resolved their claims to the San Luis Rey River. The settlement agreement is contained in pending
legislation. S. 795, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
In 1986, the Southern Ute and Ute Mountain Ute tribes, together with the federal government, the
State of Colorado, and various Colorado towns and special districts negotiated a settlement agreement.
Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement (Dec. 10, 1986). The settlement agree-
ment is centered on the construction of the $573 million Animas-La Plata Project that will serve Indi-
ans and non-Indians who will share its costs with the federal government. 1986 COLORADO DEP'T OF
NATURAL RESOURcEs REPORT 8.
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incorporate provisions for water development and building delivery
systems as well as addressing water management issues. Indians and
non-Indians can benefit from greater certainty and from jointly used
water development facilities. Settlements can give tribes actual, not
just theoretical, access to their water resources, and can provide cer-
tainty and other benefits for non-Indians.
Declining Quality
Indian reservations face some of the greatest water pollution
threats of any areas in the nation. A 1985 report of the Council of
Energy Resource Tribes found that 1196 hazardous waste generators
and disposal sites are on or near the twenty-five reservations sur-
veyed.3" Abandoned asbestos mines and tailings are located on the
San Carlos Apache and White Mountain Apache Reservations.3"
When the asbestos market collapsed in 1984, as a result of EPA regu-
lations curtailing asbestos emissions,32 companies hastily deserted res-
ervation mines and mills, leaving wastes to pollute soils and streams,
including the Salt River and the San Carlos River. An illegal pesti-
cide dump, loaded with hundreds of chemical containers, was found
on the Fort Berthold Reservation. 33 At the Oneida Tribe's Wisconsin
reservation at least one well was abandoned after groundwater was
contaminated by a closed landfill; leachate is also moving into Duck
Creek, which sustains a tribal fishery. On the same reservation, the
Fort Howard Paper Company's waste disposal lagoons have created
groundwater and surface water contamination by unknown toxics,
probably including PCB's.34 There are many other examples of seri-
ous water contamination problems in Indian country. The most egre-
gious is United Nuclear Corporation's uranium mill tailings pond near
Church Rock, New Mexico, which spilled an enormous quantity of
radioactive tailings into the Rio Puerco, which runs through the Nav-
ajo Reservation.35
A survey recently completed by Americans for Indian Opportu-
30. COUNCIL OF ENERGY RESOURCE TRIBES (CERT), INVENTORY OF HAZARDOUS WASTE
GENERATORS AND SITES ON SELECTED INDIAN RESERVATIONS, Appendix F (July, 1985); Study
Finds 1,200 Sites Near Indian Lands, Recommends Immediate Action at Six Locations, 16 ENV'T. REP.
(BNA) 1228 (1985).
31. CERT, supra note 30.
32. The standard for asbestos manufacturing requires that no visible emissions be discharged and
the standard for asbestos-containing material is that spray applied to buildings and pipes be one percent
asbestos, or less. 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.144 and 61.148 (1987).
33. CERT, supra note 30.
34. Id.
35. See 10 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1465 (1979). The United Nuclear Corporation site is listed on
EPA's National Priorities List, 40 C.F.R. § 300, App. B (1986).
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nity (A1O) (under contract with the Environmental Protection
Agency) found that the most serious reservation pollution problems
involved water quality, solid waste disposal, hazardous waste manage-
ment, and sewage disposal, all of which pose hazards to reservation
water supplies. The AIO study reported that the consequences of
groundwater contamination were especially grave for Indian reserva-
tions because some ninety-four percent of the reservations responding
depend on groundwater for drinking water supplies. Sixty-five percent
of the tribes said that groundwater is their sole source of drinking
water.
3 6
The water pollution threat to Indian country is disproportion-
ately great. Indian population is about one-half of one percent of the
national population,3 7 and Indians own about three percent of the na-
tion's land area. Yet tribes tend to suffer more than their share of
pollution threats because there are large mineral deposits, mines and
mills on Indian reservations. 38 Remote reservations are also targets
for the illegal dumping of waste.3 9 In addition, reservations located in
the midst of great industrialized areas like Tacoma and Phoenix suffer
from the waste and pollution produced by that industrialization.4'
The consequences of serious water pollution are especially severe
in the case of Indian reservations. Reservations are vestiges of much
larger estates once claimed by tribes, and as such are often marginally
adequate for tribal members' needs. The productive capacity of reser-
vations will be reduced or even destroyed if they become seriously pol-
luted. For example, Indian fisheries are vital to the cultures and
economies of some tribes.4 ' These interests are secured by treaty
36. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SURVEY OF AMERICAN INDIAN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION NEEDS ON RESERVATION LANDS: 1986, at vi (1986).
37. Derived from the 1980 Bureau of Census figures.
38. See, e.g., I AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 338-39 (1977);
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF INDIAN LANDS AND INCOME FROM
SURFACE AND SUBSURFACE LEASES (1984).
39. CERT, supra note 30, at 24.
40. The Gila River Indian Reservation borders on Phoenix, Arizona. Part of the Puyallup Indian
Reservation is surrounded by the city of Tacoma, Washington. See Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Port of
Tacoma, 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1049 (1984) (affirming the tribe's title to
the riverbed of the Puyallup River within Tacoma based on an 1857 treaty.).
41. See United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 350 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d
676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086 (1976) ("... one common cultural characteristic among
all these Indians was the almost universal and generally paramount dependence upon the products of
an aquatic economy, especially anadromous fish, to sustain the Indian way of life. These fish were vital
to the Indian diet, played an important role in their religious life, and constituted a major element of
their trade and economy."). See also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) ("The right to
resort to the fishing places ... was a part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the exercise of
which there was not a shadow of impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence
of the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed.").
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promises, but may be lost if water quality is not protected. Protection
of a healthy environment is especially important to Indians, who have
the worst health statistics of any identifiable group of Americans.42
Furthermore, as most Indian tribes are economically depressed, they
are challenged to pursue essential economic development and growth
without destroying the environment on which much of their culture is
based.
Tribal Water Allocation and Regulation
Indian tribes unquestionably hold powers of self-government.43
An informed and responsible exercise of Indian governmental power is
necessary to secure access to the quantity of water that will enable
tribes to sustain their homelands and cultures and lead to rational use
of resources shared with non-Indians. Tribal sovereignty extends be-
yond checking petty offenses of tribal members and resolving occa-
sional civil conflicts." Thus, tribes now protect their reservation
resources through environmental and land use regulation.45 Several
tribes have begun to exert regulatory authority over their water re-
sources. Ordinances and codes extend tribal authority over all water
resources and all reservation water uses.46 Congress has recognized
tribal sovereignty over reservation water allocation and administration
in the 1987 Clean Water Act reauthorization legislation.
42. See OUR BROTHER'S KEEPER: THE INDIAN IN WHITE AMERICA 56-58 (E. Cahn ed. 1969).
See also U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, INDIAN HEALTH, AGE-ADJUSTED MORTALITY
RATES, AMERICAN INDIANS AND ALASKA NATIVES IN RESERVATION STATES AND SELECTED U.S.
POPULATIONS BY RACE, 1980 (Number of Deaths per 100,000 Population) (1984). The statistics show
a continuing pattern of improvement, but the Indian mortality rate is still higher than mortality among
all citizens.
43. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 232-37 (1982 ed.) [hereinafter cited as
COHEN].
44. Id. at 246-57 (tribes have all the power of a sovereign, including the power to determine the
form of the tribal government, the power to legislate, and the power to administer justice).
45. See, e.g., Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency's approval of the Northern Cheyenne tribe's request for redesignating its
reservation from Class II to Class I under the Clean Air Act); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363 (9th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982) (upholding health regulation of a grocery store on non-
Indian land); and Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900, 903 (9th Cir. 1982)
(upholding a tribal zoning ordinance affecting fee lands owned by non-Indians located within the reser-
vation. The court held that the "interest of the Tribes in protecting their homeland from exploitation
justifies the zoning code.").
46. See Shupe supra note 6, at 581-88. Tribes that have enacted water codes include the Umatilla
Tribe in Oregon, Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation in Washington, the Spokane
Tribe in Washington, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe in North and South Dakota, the Flathead Indian
Reservation in Montana, several Mission Indian Bands in California, the Gila River Tribes in Arizona,
and the Yakima Indian Nation in Washington.
47. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7, 77 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 1377(e)). The "Wallop Amendment" which was designed to protect state sovereignty over the alloca-
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The wisdom of a tribe's seeking to control water use on the reser-
vation is beyond cavil. But assertions of tribal control bring tribes
squarely into conflict with states that claim authority over non-Indians
with water rights inside reservation boundaries,48 and perhaps even
over Indians who hold rights pursuant to state law.49 Ultimately the
determination of which governmental entity is entitled to set and en-
force water use policies on Indian reservations will be more important
than the agonized decision of which court has authority to quantify a
tribe's reserved rights.5" The cultural vitality of tribes is tied to the
application of tribal values to guide the use of reservation resources.51
Current Department of Interior policy unfortunately frustrates
the application and enforcement of tribal water codes. Many tribes,
particularly those organized under the 1934 Indian Reorganization
Act (IRA),52 must submit their ordinances and codes to the Secretary
of Interior for approval.5 3 As tribes began to enact codes in the mid-
1970s, many western states brought pressure on the Department of
Interior to disapprove codes submitted for approval.54 In reaction,
Secretary of Interior Rogers C.B. Morton imposed a moratorium on
all such approvals.55 With one exception, 6 no tribal water codes have
been approved in over ten years. The ostensible reason for the morato-
rium was to permit Interior's consideration of rules that would pro-
vide guidelines for approval. Proposed rules were published in 1977," 7
tion of water resources from conflicts with the Clean Water Act was amended to include protection and
respect for tribal water allocation authority.
48. See United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984), and Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) (both cases are
discussed in text infra notes 66-69).
49. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 582-83. While generally state laws do not govern the use of
water by Indians on Indian lands, where water rights that have vested under state law are acquired by
Indians, it can be argued that a state has an interest substantial enough to justify its exercise of regula-
tory jurisdiction over Indians using water on the reservation pursuant to state water rights. See United
States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
50. See Pelcyger, Indian Water Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST.
743, 773-74 (1975).
51. See generally Pelcyger, The Winters Doctrine and the Greening of the Reservations, 4 J. CON-
TEMP. L. 19 (1977).
52. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
53. Id. at § 476.
54. GETCHES & WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 715 (1986).
55. Memorandum from the Sec'y of the Interior, Rogers C.B. Morton, to the Comm'r of Indian
Affairs (Jan. 15, 1975).
56. The United States acquiesced to a provision in the Fort Peck/Montana Compact which recog-
nized tribal authority to enforce a water code. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-20-201(V)(B) (1987); see infra
notes 75-76. That code would only apply to the use of reservation water by tribal members, and all
non-Indian successors in interest to any Indian allottee, who use the water within the reservation.
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-20-207(V)(B) and 85-20-201(III)(A), (B) (1987).
57. Indian Reservation Use of Water, 42 Fed. Reg. 14,885 (1977).
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and revised in 1981.58 Final rules have never been issued, however.
This may create a serious impediment to water code promulgation by
IRA tribes that have requirements for Secretarial approval of tribal
laws in their governing documents.59
Tribes not under the IRA, such as the Navajo Nation, ordinarily
may enact and enforce codes without Secretarial approval.' Indeed,
when the Navajo Nation submitted their code in 1974 to determine
whether it required approval, they received a reply saying that it did
not.6" Some tribes, like the Umatilla in Oregon, essentially ignoring
the moratorium, aggressively administer and enforce their tribal water
codes.6 2 Others have not been so bold and have failed to develop
codes. Thus, Department of Interior policy impedes many tribes' ef-
forts to have a meaningful role in managing the development of their
water.
The most controversial aspect of tribal water codes is the question
of whether they apply to non-Indians using water within a reservation
on land held in fee title. There is no question that Indians within the
reservation are subject to tribal regulation.63 The question is more
complicated, however, when a non-Indian is involved. The general
rule is that non-Indians may be regulated within an Indian reservation
when they are on land belonging to the tribe or held by the United
States in trust for a tribe.6 4 On the other hand, non-Indians on land
owned by nonmembers may be regulated only if they have entered into
consensual relationships with the tribe, such as through contracts and
leases, or if a court finds that their conduct "threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
58. Regulation of Reserved Waters on Indian Reservations, 46 Fed. Reg. 944 (1981).
59. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 149; Comment, Tribal Self-Government and the Indian Reor-
ganization Act of 1934, 70 MIcH. L. REV. 955, 968-69, 976-77 (1972).
60. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (tax ordinance en-
acted without Secretarial approval was enforceable as against non-Indian entity).
61. Letter from Area Director, Bureau of Indian Affairs, to Chairman, Navajo Tribal Council,
dated January 27, 1986. Although the letter plainly stated that: "There is no Tribal governing docu-
ment which requires Secretarial approval" of the resolution, it recited the fact that a moratorium on
Indian water code approvals was in effect. The letter then equivocated, adding that Secretarial ap-
proval would be required to the extent the tribe asserted jurisdiction over Indian trust lands outside the
reservation.
62. INTERIM WATER CODE, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation (1981).
63. See COHEN, supra notes 43-44.
64. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 255. See also Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (up-
holding a tribal tax on cattle owned by non-Indians that were grazing on tribal lands); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980) (validating the imposition of tribal taxes on cigarettes
purchased by non-Indians on the reservation. The Court held that "the power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe.., is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty
which the tribes retain .. " Id. at 152.)
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health or welfare of the tribe."6 5
Applying established principles, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a tribe may impose its water regulations, to the exclu-
sion of state law, on a non-Indian owner of an allotment within the
Colville Reservation in Washington.6 6 The stream involved in that
case was entirely within the Colville Reservation. A few years later,
the Ninth Circuit decided a case that involved a stream that arose off
the Spokane Reservation and flowed for only a short distance along its
eastern boundary before discharging into the Spokane River outside
the reservation. The Ninth Circuit ruled that regulation of non-Indian
use of waters from that stream, in excess of the tribe's own needs, was
not within the tribe's inherent sovereignty. Consequently, the state
had authority to regulate the non-Indian use of "excess" or "surplus"
waters on nontribal land.6 7 Surplus waters are apparently quantities
in excess of those needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation con-
sistent with the Winters doctrine.6 8 The court specifically found that
"the political and economic welfare of the Tribe will not suffer adverse
impact from the state-regulated use of surplus waters by nonmembers
on non-Indian lands.",
69
The courts have moved toward what is essentially a balancing
test-balancing the interests of the tribe in regulating the water re-
source within the reservation to the exclusion of the state against the
state's interest in regulating the resource to the exclusion of the tribe.7"
Obviously, tribal interests are severely narrowed when: the water is
used by non-Indians; the place of use is non-Indian land; the stream
originates and ends outside the reservation and only touches it for part
of its course; and the waters being regulated are determined to be in
65. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981).
66. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981). Allotments are individ-
ually owned parcels conveyed to Indians initially in trust, but with the right to take or convey title in
fee on certain conditions. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 131-36, 618-24.
67. United States v. Anderson, 736 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1984).
68. See supra notes 14-17. Surplus water as described by the Ninth Circuit is water that is avail-
able beyond adjudicated tribal water rights. The adjudication "quantifies and preserves tribal water
rights," and thus subjecting other waters to the state's "jurisdiction will not infringe on the tribal right
to self-government .... Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365-66.
69. Anderson, 736 F.2d at 1365.
70. See id. at 1365-66 ("[T]he balance of interest weighs most heavily in favor of the state. ...
[T]he state's interest depends, in large part, on the extent to which water ways .. .transcend the
exterior boundaries of Indian country.... Washington's interest in developing a comprehensive water
program for the allocation of surplus waters weighs heavily in favor of permitting it to extend its
regulatory authority to the excess waters, if any, of the Chamokane Basin.") and White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136, 145 ("This inquiry is not dependent on mechanical or absolute
conceptions of state or tribal sovereignty, but has called for a particularized inquiry into the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake. ... )  See generally Note, Indian Water Rights. The
Continuing Jurisdictional Nightmare, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 841 (1985).
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excess of tribal needs. It may be reasonable to determine the relative
degree of each government's authority by weighing their respective in-
terests, but practical problems occur when each government has
strong interests that are in conflict.
A waterway is best regulated by a single entity with jurisdiction
over all users, 7 1 although it is rarely contained within the boundaries
of a single government. Multiple jurisdiction results in unnecessary
duplication, expense, and lack of coordination. At worst, it can lead
to heated conflict and inefficient, wasteful use of the resource. One
jurisdiction may allow water to be allocated for a use that the other
jurisdiction does not allow. For instance, if tribal law disallows use of
water in a slurry pipeline as not a "beneficial use" but state law in-
cludes it among permissible beneficial uses, a non-Indian water user on
non-Indian land within an Indian reservation might receive a state
permit to divert large quantities of water within an Indian reservation
for a slurry pipeline. Another policy conflict may arise if a tribe coor-
dinates and limits consumptive uses to promote instream flows in or-
der to maintain a fishery on the reservation, but state law does not
consider instream flows to be a beneficial use of water. Tribes and
states can resolve these conflicts by basing their regulations on consul-
tation and cooperative agreement. Their ability to do so may be frus-
trated, however, when they differ in their fundamental goals for water
management.
Tribes and states are beginning to sow the seeds of cooperation.
For instance the Oregon Commission on Indian Services convened
meetings on water policy that were attended by representatives of
tribes and state agencies. 72 The Montana Reserved Water Rights
Commission provides another example of cooperative management ef-
forts.73 Its efforts to negotiate resolutions of Indian reserved rights
claims could form the basis for a dialogue leading to better manage-
ment by both governments. The Assiniboine and Sioux Tribes of the
Fort Peck Reservation have settled their water rights claims with the
State of Montana.74 The settlement provides for tribal administration
of water rights under a tribal water code. The code was adopted and
approved 75 by the Secretary of the Interior notwithstanding a decade-
71. See generally J. MATHER, WATER RESOURCES: DISTRIBUTION, USE, AND MANAGEMENT
23-26, 317-326 (1984). See also Pelcyger, supra note 50, at 770.
72. See Shupe, supra note 6, at 590.
73. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-212 (1987). The commission is to "make the negotiation of water
rights claimed by the federal government or Indian tribes.., its highest priority." MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 85-2-701(2) (1987).
74. Supra note 29.
75. FORT PECK TRIBAL WATER CODE, Resolution No. 993-BG-5 (May 15, 1986), as amended by
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long moratorium on such approvals.76
Tribal water codes must reflect native culture and values if they
are to work for reservation people. A code that is identical to state
water law may not be sensitive to tribal customs and needs. For in-
stance, a traditional fishing tribe would have serious problems with a
tribal water administration program that gives preference to agricul-
tural uses. Yet a code that reflects such sensitivity may produce con-
flicts. When the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes have sought
to protect instream flows on the Flathead Indian Reservation in Mon-
tana, causing occasional diminution of the quantities of water that
could be delivered to non-Indians from an Indian irrigation system on
the reservation, litigation followed. The tribes succeeded in an action
to require the Bureau of Indian Affairs to maintain instream flows and
reservoir levels needed to protect their fisheries.77 When the BIA
adopted a similar plan for protecting fisheries the following year, the
reservation irrigation district, which served predominantly non-Indi-
ans, challenged the plan. The district argued that it was entitled to a
just and equal distribution of water.78 The Court of Appeals ruled
that the Indians' right to waters for a fishery are prior to any irrigation
rights and only after fishery waters are protected can any right to a fair
and equal distribution of water be asserted.7 9
If tribes are to be responsible water managers they must carry out
their laws competently and professionally. Several tribes are rising to
this challenge. The Navajo Nation's Division of Water Resources has
assumed responsibility for water planning, development, permitting
and regulation. It employs 244 people and operates on an annual
Resolution Nos. 1152-86-9, 1553-86-9, and 1554-86-9 (Sept. 22, 1986), approved by Assistant Secretary
of the Interior, Ross 0. Swimmer, Oct. 6, 1986.
76. The Secretary of the Interior authorized departmental approval of the code as an exception to
the moratorium discussed supra at notes 53-59. Secretary Donald Hodel approved an exception to the
moratorium on April 8, 1985, by accepting the recommendation of Solicitor Frank Richardson and
Deputy Under Secretary William Horn that was contained in a memorandum to Secretary Hodel dated
April 2, 1985.
77. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Flathead Irrigation and Power Project, 616 F.
Supp. 1292 (D. Mont. 1985). The court issued a temporary restraining order to protect tribal fisheries.
Before a hearing on the preliminary injunction was held, the tribes and the project (administered by
BIA) reached a stipulation establishing minimum flows for various streams and minimum pool levels
for particular reservoirs. The case was dismissed, as it had effectively become moot.
78. 25 U.S.C. § 381 (1982) provides:
In cases where the use of water for irrigation is necessary to render the lands within any
Indian reservation available for agricultural purposes, the Secretary of the Interior is au-
thorized to prescribe such rules and regulations as he may deem necessary to secure a just
and equal distribution thereof among the Indians residing upon any such reservation.
No regulations have been promulgated pursuant to the section.
79. Joint Bd. of Control of Flathead, Mission and Jocko Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 832
F.2d 1127 (9th Cir. 1987).
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budget of $7 million.8" Besides its regulatory functions, the agency
assists water users in achieving better water management through im-
proved irrigation system operation, soil conservation programs, well
development, and group product marketing services.
Recognizing the need for greater skill and training by tribal water
managers, the American Indian Resources Institute (a project of the
American Indian Lawyer Training Program) has begun a special
training program for tribal leaders and water managers. 81 The pro-
gram includes several weeks of intensive training in water manage-
ment, engineering, administration, regulation, and law. Leading water
management professionals are employed as trainers.
Tribal Water Pollution Control
A few tribes have adopted comprehensive reservation pollution
control legislation. The Colville Tribe has enacted several water pollu-
tion control ordinances,8 2 but most tribes deal with pollution problems
in a cursory way, if at all. For instance, the Umatilla code recites "to
minimize pollution" as one policy goal;83 but the only operative sec-
tion makes persons responsible for "placement, spilling or introduc-
tion of any" pollutant into waters of the reservation liable for damages
and civil penalties.84 There are no details on how this is to be carried
out. The otherwise detailed Navajo Water Code merely mentions pro-
tecting water quality as one of its purposes.85 Guidelines are to be
promulgated by the tribal administrative agency, "to ensure adequate
quality" as well as quantity of water and are to be reflected in water
use permits.86 There is also a vague provision making it an offense to
undertake an unauthorized act "affecting" waters on the reservation.87
Tribes have new opportunities for participation in solving pollu-
tion problems under recent amendments to federal water pollution
80. GETCHES & WILKINSON, supra note 54, at 715 n.3.
81. Since the establishment of AIRI, it has held summer courses on Tribal Water Management in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, August 6-15, 1986, and July 13-August 14, 1987.
82. COLVILLE WATER CODE, Colville Confederated Tribes, Colville Indian Reservation (1974).
The Colville Tribe adopted the Colville Administrative Procedure Act, Resolution No. 1985-20, Title
30, COLVILLE TRIBAL CODE (Jan. 18, 1985), to guide implementation and review of administrative
actions under its pollution laws: On-Site Wastewater Treatment and Disposal Act (Title 30), Colville
Mining Water Quality Protection Act (Title 3 1), Colville Forest Practices Water Quality Act (Title 32)
and Colville Water Quality Standards Act (Title 33).
83. INTERIM WATER CODE, Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation § 1 (1981).
84. Id. at § IX.
85. NAVAJO NATION WATER CODE § 22-11-1502(11) (Supp. 1984-85) (minimizing water quality
degradation is listed as one of many policy guidelines for making the most effective use of available
water resources).
86. Id. at § 22-11-1703.
87. Id. at § 22-11-2302.
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control and clean-up laws. Indian tribes were given expanded oppor-
tunities to participate in the benefits and the implementation of several
federal laws; they can receive grants and can assume management of
pollution control within their borders in the same manner as states.
Clean Water Act. Congress passed the Clean Water Act in
1972.88 It relies primarily on state-administered permitting programs
under a "National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System"
(NPDES). Permits are required for every discharge of a pollutant into
waters of the United States from "point sources" such as pipes, canals,
and other discrete sources that discharge pollutants. 89 Congress au-
thorized the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to approve
state permit programs, but if a state does not assume this responsibility
or does not carry it out consistent with the law, EPA will operate the
program.90 NPDES permits are based on federally set standards for
maximum discharges of various pollutants and maintenance of state-
set water quality standards for the streams receiving discharges.9'
In addition to the NPDES program, the Act provides financial
and technical assistance to aid states in developing their own regula-
tory approaches. 92 Municipalities-a term that is defined by the Act
to include tribes93are eligible for grants for the construction of pub-
licly owned sewage treatment facilities.94
The 1987 Act reauthorizing the Clean Water Act 95 treats tribes
the same as states for all of the Act's significant regulatory pro-
grams.96 This means that tribes may assume full responsibility on In-
88. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
89. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(C) (1982).
91. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1982).
92. 33 U.S.C. § 1254(3)(b) (1982).
93. "Municipalities" are defined as including Indian tribes or authorized Indian tribal organiza-
tions. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4) (1982).
94. 33 U.S.C. § 1281(g)(1) (1982).
95. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
96. Id. at 77 (to be codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)) (authorizing the Administrator of EPA to
treat Indian tribes as states for purposes of Title II grants for construction of treatment works (§ 205)
and for §§ 104, 106, 303, 305, 308, 309, 314, 319, 401 and 404 of the Act "to the degree necessary to
carry out the objectives of this section."). Implementation and enforcement responsibilities may only
be delegated to a tribe if:
(1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and
powers; (2) the functions to be exercised by the Indian tribe pertain to the management and
protection of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States
in trust for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject
to a trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation;
and (3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's judg-
ment, of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms
and purposes of this Act and of all applicable regulations.
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dian reservations for permitting programs under the Act, including
the power to set water quality standards for reservation streams. Fed-
eral financial assistance is also available to help tribes develop their
own programs.
97
Safe Drinking Water Act.98 Programs established under the Act
protect aquifers that are likely to be used for drinking water supplies,
and EPA sets maximum contaminant levels for public water sys-
tems.99 The Sole Source Aquifer Protection Program provides that
when an aquifer is the sole source of a drinking water supply and is so
designated by EPA, no federal assistance may be provided for any pro-
ject that EPA determines may contaminate the aquifer.'1o The Under-
ground Injection Control (UIC) program t ' sets standards for the
design and operation of injection wells for the disposal of wastes. The
Wellhead Protection Program 0 2 provides for adoption of methods to
protect areas surrounding wells that supply public water systems from
contaminants. States are eligible to assume primary responsibility for
the conduct of the Wellhead Protection and the UIC programs.1
0 3
Amendments adopted in June, 1986, enable the EPA administrator to
delegate enforcement authority to Indian tribes, treating them as states
for most purposes under the Act." If EPA does not designate a tri-
bal government to run a Safe Drinking Water Act program on an In-
dian reservation, it may operate the program itself.' 5
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).
°6
This Act regulates the handling, storage, sale and application of pesti-
cides. Since its enactment in 1978, both states and tribes have been
eligible for delegation of full enforcement authority, making it the first
federal environmental statute to allow such delegation. 0 7 So far, EPA
has approved delegation of authority to only one tribe (Fort Berthold)
under FIFRA. The tribe's FIFRA regulations were approved over
strong state objections.'0" The Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe"0 9 and
97. Id. (states and tribes can also receive grants for pollution control programs under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1256).
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-1l (1982 & Supp. 1987).
99. Maximum contaminant levels are set pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 (1982).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-6 (1982).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 300h (1982).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7 (1982).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300h-7 and 300h-I (1982).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 300j-l1 (1982).
105. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986).
106. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
107. 7 U.S.C. § 136u (1982).
108. See Intent to Approve Fort Berthold Indian Reservation Plan for Certification of Applica-
tors of Restricted Use Pesticides, 50 Fed. Reg. 31,011 (1985); Supplemental Notice of Intent to Ap-
prove Tribal Fort Berthold Pesticide Plan and Cooperative Enforcement Agreement, 51 Fed. Reg.
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Rosebud Sioux Tribe 1 ° are pursuing primacy for enforcement of tri-
bal regulation of pesticide storage, disposal and containers.
Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).11I This Act
was designed to protect groundwater from the menaces of waste dispo-
sal with programs regulating solid and hazardous wastes. The Solid
Waste Disposal program sets criteria and operating standards for solid
waste facilities to prevent environmental damage from leachates.,
t2
Tribes are defined as "municipalities" eligible for financial assistance
for facilities planning, feasibility studies, experts, surveys, legal assist-
ance, technology assistance, and resource conservation. Funds are
available for analyzing the legal, institutional and economic impedi-
ments to developing systems for the conservation of energy and mater-
ials. 1 3 The Hazardous Wastes Management program creates a
tracking system for hazardous wastes from the time they are gener-
ated, throughout their transportation and use, to their ultimate
disposal. 14
The EPA can delegate responsibilities under RCRA's Hazardous
Waste program to states that propose programs substantially
equivalent to the federal program," t5 but the Act says nothing about
tribes. The agency approved the State of Washington's plan for as-
suming RCRA responsibilities throughout the state "except as to In-
dian lands." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld EPA's
limited approval for the action," 6 stressing that the state had little
jurisdiction on the reservation and none whatsoever over Indians.
Further, the court found that EPA's policy of respecting Indian sover-
22,860 (1986). The tribe's Pesticide Plan and Cooperative Enforcement Agreement was finally ap-
proved on October 2, 1986.
The concerns raised during the initial 30-day comment period were primarily over jurisdictional
and enforcement issues relating to the pesticide plan, not over the technical adequacy of the tribe's
certification plan. The main concern was that EPA intended to grant jurisdiction over non-Indians to
the tribes and take it away from North Dakota. Another concern was that while non-Indians are a
majority of the reservation population, they have no voice, vote or representation in tribal government.
The state was concerned that the tribes would implement the plan in a discriminatory manner and that
the program would financially damage pesticide dealers based on the reservation because certified appli-
cators would buy the restricted pesticides elsewhere to avoid detection by the tribes. 51 Fed. Reg.
22,861 (1986).
109. Telephone interview with Jane W. Gardner, Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Region VIII (Sept. 14, 1987). 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a) (1982) allows EPA to enter
into cooperative agreements with tribes for enforcement authority.
110. Id.
111. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991(i) (1983 & Supp. 1987).
112. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 6948(a) (1982 & Supp. II1 1985).
114. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (Supp. III 1985).
116. Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
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eignty and encouraging self-government was reasonable and reflected
the "federal commitment to tribal self-regulation in environmental
matters."" 7 EPA thus retained authority over hazardous waste man-
agement on Washington Indian reservations.
RCRA does not specifically instruct EPA on the treatment of In-
dian tribes as states, but it is likely that if EPA delegated its own au-
thority to the tribe it would be sustained. The reasoning in Nance v.
Environmental Protection Agency would support such a conclusion." 8
In Nance the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no specific
statutory authority is needed for a delegation of authority to an Indian
tribe if the delegation concerns subject matter that is within the tribe's
retained sovereignty. In that case, the court upheld EPA approval of
the Northern Cheyenne Tribe's request to redesignate its reservation
from a Class II to a Class I area under the Clean Air Act' 9 pursuant
to EPA regulations allowing such redesignation upon tribal request. 1
20
The court recognized that a tribe has a realm of sovereignty in which
it can operate without the aid of any federal statutory authority. Be-
cause pollution control and virtually every activity called for under
federal water quality statutes are within a tribe's self-governing au-
thority, 2 ' delegations of authority to carry out those statutes should
be upheld.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility Act (CERCLA).122 This legislation, sometimes known as the
Superfund Act, focuses on cleaning up imminent hazards rather than
preventing pollution. Under the most familiar provisions of the Act,
over 900 especially egregious dump sites have been identified for clean-
up.123 Four of these sites are on or near Indian reservations.,
24
CERCLA provides for finding liability against "potentially re-
sponsible parties" for hazardous waste disposal damage.' 25 This term
117. Id. at 1471.
118. 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1981).
119. Id. at 717.
120. These classifications under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (1982), determine the
amount of deterioration of air quality which will be permitted in a certain area. In Class I areas, which
include national parks and wilderness areas, very little deterioration is permitted.
121. See cases cited supra note 45. See generally Will, Indian Lands Environment - Who Should
Protect It, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 465 (1978); see also Comment, The Applicability of the Federal Pollu-
tion Acts to Indian Reservations. A Case for Tribal Self-Government, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 63 (1976).
122. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
123. National Priorities List (by Rank), 40 C.F.R. § 300, App. B (1986) (this appendix lists all
the sites on the national priority list).
124. Id., Navajo Reservation, Church Rock, New Mexico; Puyallup Reservation, Commence-
ment Bay, Washington; Hoopa Valley Reservation, Celtor Chemical Works, California; Tar Creek, on
lands of several tribes in northeastern Oklahoma.
125. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a) (West 1983 & Supp. 1987).
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includes almost anyone with a past or present connection with the site,
including former owners, dumpers, operators, transporters, and
others. The Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act
(SARA),' 26 enacted in October, 1986, includes tribes, along with
states and the United States, as governments eligible to recover dam-
ages for loss or damage to natural resources.' 27 SARA allows tribes to
join states and others in cooperative agreements to conduct "re-
sponses," which are the clean-up activities necessary when a substance
has been released into the environment. The cooperating parties in a
response effort can recover the clean-up costs they bear from the re-
sponsible parties. 28 Another provision of SARA requires the study of
hazardous waste sites on all Indian reservations. 129 The survey could
result in recommending site-specific clean-up programs that could pro-
ceed with tribal participation.
Tribes may now decide to assume "primacy"-the primary re-
sponsibility for setting standards, administering and enforcing require-
ments-under several federal pollution laws as described above. This
could be an important means for tribes to exercise their inherent sov-
ereignty over reservation affairs in a way that could have substantial
benefits for tribal members. On the other hand, tribes must exercise
care to prevent assuming responsibilities that are too burdensome.
The federal statutes are enormously complex and therefore their im-
plementation demands costly technical, administrative and legal
expertise.
Under the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act and
CERCLA, the EPA Administrator must determine that tribes meet
certain standards before they will be granted primacy. The Adminis-
trator must find them capable of carrying out the requirements of the
Acts. 30 Tribes proposing to take over these new programs could have
126. P.L. No. 99-499, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-9675 (West Supp. 1987).
127. 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1705.
128. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(d) (West Supp. 1987) (if the President determines that the tribe has the
capability to carry out enforcement actions, he may enter into a cooperative agreement or contract with
the tribe).
129. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9626(c) (West Supp. 1987). The results of the survey were to be submitted in
conjunction with the fiscal year 1988 budget, but due to time constraints EPA submitted the 1985 study
conducted on only twenty-five tribes described supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text. EPA is con-
sidering doing an additional study to comply with the SARA mandate.
130. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(e) (West Supp. 1987) provides that an Indian tribe may be treated as a
state for purposes of the Clean Water Act only if:
(1) the Indian tribe has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties and
powers;
(2) the functions to be exercised by the,lndian tribe pertain to the management and protec-
tion of water resources which are held by an Indian tribe, held by the United States in trust
for Indians, held by a member of an Indian tribe if such property interest is subject to a
trust restriction on alienation, or otherwise within the borders of an Indian reservation; and
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difficulty demonstrating their capability to assume responsibilities too
weighty for many states. It is essential that tribes have financial and
technical assistance in planning for the assumption of primacy and in
building mechanisms to perform their responsibilities competently. It
is also important that the EPA Administrator not require major prac-
tical experience by tribes before full or partial enforcement responsibil-
ity is delegated to them. If such a requirement were imposed, few
tribes would qualify and the apparent congressional intent of recogniz-
ing and using tribal governments to implement federal pollution laws
on reservations would go unfulfilled.
Some of the federal statutes provide funding for tribes to assess
the types of controls and clean-up programs needed before they decide
to take responsibility for specific federal statutory programs. The Tur-
tle Mountain Indian Reservation in North Dakota conducted an EPA
funded project to study tribal environmental management, evaluate
tribal pollution problems, and develop and implement plans for tribal
pollution programs.' 3 ' A pilot project at the Menominee Reservation
in Wisconsin is developing programs for solid waste, hazardous waste,
surface and groundwater protection.13
2
A tribe may find that administration of federal statutes will not
(3) the Indian tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's judgment,
of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and
purposes of this chapter and of all applicable regulations.
See supra note 96, for the programs under which Indian tribes may be treated as states under the Clean
Water Act.
42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-I (b)(l) (West Supp. 1987) provides that an Indian tribe will be treated as a
state for purposes of the Safe Drinking Water Act only if:
(A) the Indian Tribe is recognized by the Secretary of the Interior and has a governing
body carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers;
(B) the functions to be exercised by the Indian Tribe are within the area of the Tribal
Government's jurisdiction; and
(C) the Indian Tribe is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator's judgment,
of carrying out the functions to be exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and
purposes of this subchapter and of all applicable regulations.
Tribes may be delegated primary enforcement responsibility for public water systems and UIC pro-
grams and the federal government may provide grants and contract assistance to tribes that meet the
above criteria.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9626 (West Supp. 1987) provides that the "governing body of an Indian tribe shall
be afforded substantially the same treatment as a State with respect to the provisions [of CERCLA]"
regarding notification of releases, consultation on remedial actions, access to information, health au-
thorities and roles and responsibilities under the national contingency plan and submittals of priorities
for remedial action (excluding the provision regarding nominating at least one facility per state on the
National Priorities List). 42 U.S.C. § 9601(36) defines Indian tribe as any "band, nation or other or-
ganized group or community. .. "
131. Telephone interview with Jane W. Gardner, Assistant Regional Counsel, U.S. Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, Region VIII (Sept. 14, 1987).
132. See Lewis, An Indian Policy at EPA, 12 EPA J. 23, 24 (Jan/Feb. 1986) (the Menominee
Tribe plans to draft water quality standards covering surface and groundwater).
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answer its particular pollution problems. It may not be cost effective
for a tribe to use an elaborate federal program to deal with on-reserva-
tion problems that are relatively limited. In other cases, only selected
portions of federal programs may be useful to a tribe. Tribes need not
assume full responsibility for federal pollution statutes in order to par-
ticipate in administration and enforcement of those laws. Tribes may
take responsibility for parts of programs and specific functions under
partial delegations from EPA. A tribe that is delegated authority may
in turn contract for various functions to be performed by state and
local agencies. If the tribe does not wish to be delegated authority, it
can leave the program under federal jurisdiction but contract to per-
form some of the EPA's responsibilities.
Tribes can improve pollution control, like water allocation con-
trol, through cooperative arrangements with other governments. They
can impose more effective controls without the costs of duplication by
allocating responsibilities under mutual agreements. The Menominee
Tribe's pilot project provides a model of such cooperation. The tribe
is drafting regulations and ordinances under a memorandum of agree-
ment with EPA and the state of Wisconsin. Under this program the
tribe assumes partial responsibility, while the state and EPA share
other responsibilities. The tribe retains control of the policy-making
and reservation enforcement components while the other governments
handle off-reservation enforcement and technical aspects of the pro-
gram.' 33 Tribal, state and local planning efforts are particularly well-
suited to cooperative efforts. 
134
In some cases, several tribes might form a consortium to share the
burden of administering water pollution control laws. This works best
when several tribes have similar problems in a given watershed or geo-
graphic area. Consortiums have also been formed by tribes for other
resource management purposes. For instance, five small Indian bands
in Southern California formed the San Luis Rey Water Authority to
pursue their interests in implementing the settlement of a major water
rights lawsuit. The tribes delegated to the Authority their powers to
allocate and manage water resources.' 35 The Authority has not yet
133. Popkin, Indians Act for a Cleaner Environment, 13 EPA J. 28, 29 (Apr. 1987).
134. Lewis, supra note 132, at 26. For instance, the Colville Confederated Tribes, which are
developing a Comprehensive Water Quality Management Plan under Section 208 of the Clean Water
Act, signed a Cooperative Agreement with the State of Washington.
135. Each of the bands enacted identical ordinances providing for extensive cooperation in com-
pleting and implementing a settlement of their water rights claims that have been vigorously pursued in
litigation since 1969. The most immediate purpose was to create a vehicle for financing projects and
getting the technical assistance to carry out the settlement terms, which are intended to lead to eco-
nomic development. See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying text. The ordinance of each band,
among other things, "[g]rants and delegates to the Authority the power to control, manage, deliver and
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begun to exercise these powers, but may eventually assume full control
over water management for all the bands. Other examples of tribal
resource management consortiums include the Northwest Indian
Fisheries Commission'36 and the Columbia River Intertribal Fish
Commission; 37 both are cooperative fisheries management programs
that deal with a resource common to several reservations in a scientifi-
cally responsible manner. They provide fishing opportunities that sat-
isfy commercial, subsistence and ceremonial needs. The member
tribes pool enforcement, judicial, and technical expertise and mecha-
nisms. The tribes act through a single entity rather than multiple enti-
ties, facilitating interaction and cooperation with the states.
A 1984 Environmental Protection Agency policy requires the
agency to work with tribes on a "government-to-government" basis,
furnish tribes with information and assistance in program develop-
ment, and incorporate tribal needs and concerns into EPA activities.
The policy also commits EPA to work with tribal governments in
achieving compliance with environmental statutes. 138  The promise
allocate the water resources of the five bands" that are allocated to the Authority by the settlement, and
by further tribal resolutions or ordinances. E.g., Pauma Band of Mission Indians Ordinance adopted
September 23, 1984, p. 17. See also S. 795, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1987), approving powers of the
Authority.
136. See PACIFIC NORTHWEST RIVER BASINS COMMISSION, AGENCIES, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
INTERESTS AFFECTING COLUMBIA RIVER ANADROMOUS FISH (1980). Courts have begun to cite and
rely upon data developed by the Commission. E.g., United States v. Washington, 645 F.2d 749, 752
(9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Washington, 641 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2 (9th Cir. 1981). Cf. United
States v. Washington, 506 F. Supp. 187, 194 n.25 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
137. See Wilkinson & Conner, supra note 4, at 98 n.437. The Ninth Circuit recognized the Com-
mission's position on fish harvests in United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816, 824 (9th Cir. 1985).
138. See OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATOR, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RES-
ERVATIONS (1984) (hereinafter cited as EPA Indian Policy]. The nine points of the EPA Indian Policy
are:
1. The Assistant Administrator for External Affairs will serve as lead agency clearing-
house and coordinator for all Indian policy matters.
2. The Indian Work Group (IWG) will assist and support the Assistant Administrator for
External Affairs in developing and recommending detailed guidance as needed on Indian
policy and implementation matters. Assistant Administrators, Regional Administrators
and the General Counsel should designate appropriate representatives to the Indian Work
Group and provide them with adequate time and resources needed to carry out the IWG's
responsibilities under the direction of the Assistant Administrator for External Affairs.
3. Assistant and Regional Administrators should undertake activity outreach and liaison
with the tribes, providing adequate information to allow them to work with us in an in-
formed way.
4. Assistant and Regional Administrators should allocate resources to meet tribal needs,
within the constraints imposed by competing priorities and by our legal system.
5. Assistant and Regional Administrators, with legal support provided by the General
Counsel, should assist tribal governments in program development as they have done for
the states.
6. Assistant Administrators, Regional Administrators and the General Counsel should
take active steps to allow tribes to provide informed input into EPA's decision-making and
program management activities which affect reservation environments.
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held out by the EPA policy has not been fully realized because of limi-
tations on funding. Tribes cannot assess environmental protection
needs without financial assistance. Furthermore, the provision in the
policy that refers to tribes achieving compliance with environmental
statutes could be read by some officials as mandating enforcement ac-
tivities against tribes. However, it would be inconsistent with the
spirit of the policy to use it to impose burdens on tribes without afford-
ing them the benefit of assistance.
Besides problems of funding and technical assistance, tribes con-
sidering taking responsibility for federal pollution control programs
should consider their possible exposure to liability for their actions as
a regulator. A federal court in South Dakota has held that the Ogal-
lala Sioux tribe, which regulates waste disposal on the reservation, is
subject to citizen suit provisions of the Resources Conservation and
Recovery Act in a claim for damage to a drinking water supply from a
solid waste dump on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation.' 39
Tribal Water Marketing
Market transactions provide a means for reallocating water
throughout the West so that it will be put to the most valuable uses.
As agriculture declines in importance and cities continue to grow,
water rights transfers from one use to the other could be mutually
beneficial.' 40 Transactions responding to market forces are said to im-
prove the efficiency of water use.' 4 '
If the movement of non-Indian water from one use to another
(based on market forces) promotes efficiency and wise use, it may be
beneficial for Indian water to be traded as well. Non-Indian purchas-
ers will have a greater opportunity to expand businesses and commu-
7. Assistant and Regional Administrators should, to the maximum feasible extent, incor-
porate tribal concerns, needs and preferences into EPA's policy decisions and program
management activities affecting reservations.
8. Assistant Administrators, Regional Administrators and the General Counsel should
work cooperatively with the tribal governments to achieve compliance with environmental
statutes and regulations on Indian reservations, consistent with the principle of Indian self-
government.
9. Assistant Administrators, Regional Administrators and the General Counsel should
begin to factor Indian policy goals into their long-range planning and program management
activities, including budget, operating guidance, management accountability systems and
performance standards.
139. Blue Legs v. EPA, No. 85-5097 (D.S.D. Sept. 3, 1987) (tribes are "regulated entities" under
RCRA and therefore are subject to the citizen suit provisions of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(l)(A) and
(B) (Supp. I1 1985)).
140. See Tarlock, supra note 8, at 145, 168-173; WATER EFFICIENCY TASK FORCE. supra note 8.
141. E.g., Wahl & Osterhoudt, Voluntary Transfers of Water in the West, in NATIONA. WATER
SUMMARY 1985-HYDROEOGIc EVENTS AND SURFACE-WATER RESOURCES 113 (United States Geo-
logical Survey Water-Supply Paper 2300, 1986); Gould, Conversion of Agricultural Water Rights to
Industrial Use, 27B ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1791 (1982).
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nities if Indian water is made available to them in market transactions
Tribes may find that the economic benefits of water sales are far
greater than the benefits of using the same water for their own
purposes.
Many state laws restrict market transfers of water, and the effects
of many trades on third parties limit their efficacy. '42 The issue is even
more complicated with Indian water rights. At one extreme, the mar-
keting of Indian water is seen as entirely contrary to the notion of
reserved rights-a doctrine that was created to enable reservation de-
velopment. 143  Others suspect marketing as yet another device for
parting Indians from their resources.
Tribes must have congressional permission to market their water
because Indians can transfer interests in reservation real property only
if Congress consents.' Congress has given blanket authorization to
the leasing of Indian land, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior. '45 The Ninth Circuit long ago ruled that lessees of Indian
lands can make use of Indian water rights on those leased lands; more
recently, the same court held that when an allotment is transferred to
a non-Indian the conveyance can carry with it a share of the tribe's
reserved water right.146 Although the courts have not spoken specifi-
cally as to transferability of Indian water apart from a lease of land,
the right to use water is an interest in real property and the validity of
a transfer of that right, even temporarily, would seem subject to con-
gressional approval.
The National Water Commission recommended enactment of
general legislation authorizing Indians to lease their water rights.'
47
The Commission saw this as a way of dealing with the uncertainties
plaguing both Indians who want to preserve their Winters rights for
the future and non-Indians who want to secure a dependable water
supply. Congress has not acted to implement the recommendation.
Some commentators argue that Indian water should not be alien-
142. Gould, supra note 141, at 1820-46. See also Martz & Raley, Administering Colorado's
Water: A Critique of the Present Approach, in TRADITION, INNOVATION AND CONFLICT 52-57 (L.
MacDonnell ed. 1986).
143. See Palma, Considerations and Conclusions Concerning the Transferability of Indian Water
Rights, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 90 (1980).
144. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982); New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537 F.2d 1102, 1110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); United States v. Ahtanum Irrigation Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 998 (1957); see also COHEN, supra note 43, at 593.
145. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1983).
146. Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93 (9th Cir. 1921), and Colville Confederated Tribes v. Wal-
ton, 647 F.2d 42 (9th Cir. 1981).
147. See U.S. NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE-FINAL RE-
PORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE CONGRESS 480-81 (1973).
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able for off-reservation uses, that reserved water rights were created to
fulfill the purposes of Indian reservations and hence must be used
there. 148 This interpretation is inconsistent with precedent recogniz-
ing a tribe's right to make full and flexible use of reserved rights once
they are quantified. The Supreme Court in Arizona v. California '49
found that agriculture was the specific purpose of the five Colorado
River mainstream tribes. But the Court later ruled that quantified
water rights based on the agricultural needs for all "practicably irriga-
ble acreage" could be used for any beneficial purpose. 5' The overall
purpose of virtually all Indian reservations is to provide a permanent
homeland where a tribe can be economically self-sufficient and govern
itself.'' Consequently, it is reasonable to allow a tribe's water rights
to be put to the highest economic use that the tribe may choose,
whether on or off the reservation. Indian treaties are replete with lan-
guage indicating that reservations were created to "civilize" the Indi-
ans.152 Surely non-Indian society would judge entry into the free
market and utilization of tribal resources, including land, minerals,
timber and water, as capital assets, to be among the most "civilized"
activities a tribe could undertake. Thus, reservation purposes conceiv-
ably could be fulfilled by selling or leasing water to others for use off
the reservation. Whether such transactions were specifically contem-
plated by Congress when it reserved lands is not the issue. Congress's
intent relates to quantification, not use. In any event, if Congress ap-
proves specific transactions any issue of its intent becomes moot.
There are policy considerations that a tribe may want to weigh
before it authorizes the use of its water outside the reservation. Will
the tribe be able to reclaim and begin using its water at the end of a
lease? What happens to the tribal community and way of life while
water is being exported? Will off-reservation water use render the res-
ervation relatively useless, lead to the disintegration of reservation life
and the assimilation of Indians into the larger society?
Tribes may decide that transfer of water to non-reservation uses is
beneficial, especially on reservations where agricultural enterprise is
unrewarding. Agriculture was culturally strange to some Indians and
148. See supra note 143.
149. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
150. Arizona v. California, 439 U.S. 419, 422 (1979).
151. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 68-70.
152. Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 64 n. 1 (1908) (1868 treaty between the United States and
Sioux Indians, Indians ceded lands and other rights for the United States' agreement to "insure the
civilization of the Indians entering this treaty. ... ); National Indian Youth Council v. Bruce, 485
F.2d 97, 98 n.1 (10th Cir. 1973) (Navajo Treaty of 1868 provides: "[i]n order to insure the civilization
of the Indians entering into this treaty. ... ). The Winters court spoke of encouraging "habits of
industry" and "advancing the civilization and improvement of the Indians." 207 U.S. at 567.
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has not been lucrative for many. Hardy, clever hunters of the Great
Plains were confined to reservations where they were given small par-
cels of land often inadequate for farming.153 Extensive leasing of these
small allotments to non-Indians resulted in large non-Indian farming
enterprises.1 54 Today, on many reservations, most of the farming is
done by non-Indians. Nationally, non-Indians produce sixty-nine per-
cent of farm income on Indian land and use seventy-eight percent of
the irrigated acreage on reservations." The community stake in con-
tinuing on-reservation agricultural water use on these reservations is
limited.
For many tribes, keeping water in the stream until it passes off the
reservation may be the highest use from the perspective of tribal cul-
ture. Traditional fishing and hunting pursuits can be sustained, along
with modern enterprises built on tourism. In some cases a tribe may
be more satisfied and "successful" selling water to a downstream mu-
nicipality or industry than it would be in making heroic efforts to de-
velop marginal agriculture or to assemble enough capital to attract
industries within the reservation boundaries that could use the water
and at the same time return an income to the tribe. Some industries,
especially heavy polluters, may be more attractive as off-reservation
water customers than as reservation lessees.
Non-Indians surely could benefit from the marketing of Indian
water rights. Indian water rights in the Colorado River have been
adjudicated for over twenty-five years, but a significant amount of this
water remains unused. Of the five mainstream tribes, who together
have rights to nearly a million acre-feet of water a year, only one has
used most of its entitlement. 5 6 Others have only begun using their
water, primarily to serve non-Indian agricultural lessees on their reser-
vations. 157 In a few cases, tribal enterprises for recreation and tourism
use the tribal apportionment to irrigate golf courses and to serve hotels
and casinos.' 58
153. See Getches, Water Rights on Indian Allotments, 26 S.D.L. REV. 405, 412-15 (1981). See
generally, D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS (F. Prucha ed. 1973).
154. See AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, 94TH CONG., 2D SEss., FINAL REPORT
318 (Comm. Print 1977).
155. Id. at 315. Recent figures show that the percentage of Indian farm land leased to non-
Indians has been declining over the past twenty years. U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, REPORT OF THE
TASK FORCE ON INDIAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 115 (1986).
156. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 653-54 n.8 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
157. See supra note 154.
158. See Note, Transferability Under the Papago Water Rights Settlement, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 421,
424 n.33 (1984) (one of the proposed uses for the Papago (Tohono O'dam) water is a large planned
community on the reservation with light industry, a golf course and hotel); Rocky Mountain News,
[Vol. 58
1988] MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING OF INDIAN WATER 545
Potential purchasers in need of water are understandably reluc-
tant to pay tribes for their water. So long as tribes lack capital, re-
served rights will go unused and the tribes' senior priority dates will
have little practical effect on non-Indian uses. Purchasers will wait
until they perceive a clear and present threat that the tribes will put
their water to use. Although this may appear rational, relatively low
cost contracts might be negotiated now to assure a purchaser a safe
annual yield or backup supplies for dry years. An arrangement like an
insurance policy could be negotiated. For instance, an off-reservation
municipal user may be willing to pay a tribe an annual fee for its
agreement not to develop water for a specified period. The agreement
might provide that when the municipality needs and uses the tribe's
water, additional payments will be made. This could prove much
cheaper than many alternative investments to protect future water
supplies.
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD)
is searching the state and its shared watersheds in earnest for new
water sources.' 59 But MWD has steadfastly insisted that it cannot and
will not purchase the right to use water from the Colorado River tribes
because it believes that to do so is inconsistent with the Winters doc-
trine and contrary to the law of the Colorado River. 6 Under the
"law of the river," which is based on interstate compacts and federal
statutes, water not used by an upstream party flows to a downstream
party.' 6 ' While there is nothing in the law to prohibit transactions
with Indian tribes that ensure delivery of water to other users, such
transactions are presently unnecessary to keep most of the Indians'
water flowing to MWD without charge. The reliability of MWD's
supply thus depends on the tribes remaining financially unable to de-
velop their water. As the tribes raise the capital needed to put their
Oct. 29, 1987, at 30, col. 2 (plans to develop a luxury resort on the Navajo Reservation that would "let
the rest of America and the world see the Navajo.")
159. METROPOLITAN WATER DIST., MWD CULTIVATES INNOVATIVE WATER SUPPLY PRO-
GRAMS WITH FARMERS, Focus, No. 2 (1986).
160. Schmitz, Utes, California Clash on Water-Project Plans, Denver Post, Aug. 23, 1987, at 6B,
col. 4, 5-6. (Myron Holburt, Assistant General Manager of the Metropolitan Water District of South-
ern California, said "that if you transfer water between states, you're destroying the whole structure,
the entire history of the law of [the] river." Holburt said that the District "has not ruled out a total
prohibition" of interstate exporting of water, as a condition to supporting the Colorado-Ute Indian
Settlement, including the Animas-La Plata water project. See infra note 168. California's opposition
could defeat legislation approving the settlement.
161. Article Ill(e) of the Colorado River Compact provides that the "States of the Upper Divi-
sion shall not withhold water, and the States of the Lower Division shall not require delivery of water,
which cannot reasonably be applied to domestic and agricultural uses." COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101
(1973); see Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16 (1966); Getches, Competing Demands
for the Colorado River, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 419-20, 475 (1985).
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water to use, MWD may become more motivated to enter into a trans-
action. At that point the tribes may elect not to sell. In any event,
MWD, or any other purchaser who fails to deal with the tribes before
such development begins, will have to pay a price that reflects the cost
of any investments that have been made to develop the water.
Experience with tribal agreements to forego water development in
order to allow non-Indian use is limited. A deferral agreement does
not actually market water, but because it bargains away the Indians'
right to use a quantity of water for a period in exchange for promises
of value to the tribe, it has many attributes of a lease.' 62 Many years
ago the Ute Indians of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation in Utah
agreed to defer use of waters to which they were entitled on over
15,000 acres of irrigable land. The agreement allowed the state and
the federal governments to proceed with construction of the behemoth
Central Utah Project (CUP). The Indians were to receive a substitute
water supply by the year 2005 from a proposed unit of the CUP. It
later became clear that the promise of future water was illusory be-
cause much of the CUP would never be constructed.' 63 The Indians
challenged the agreement as unlawful because they received little or no
consideration. Their claims led to negotiations with the state. Those
negotiations have been largely successful, although the Indians have
yet to ratify the new deferral agreement.
The Papago Tribe (now the Tohono O'dam Nation) agreed to
limit its reserved groundwater rights in return for a promise by the
state of Arizona and the United States that the tribe would receive
quantities of federal project water that it could transfer to any use.
The settlement agreement, now embodied in federal law, specifically
allows off-reservation leasing.'
64
Under the Fort Peck Compact with Montana, the tribes may
market up to 50,000 acre-feet of water a year for off-reservation
uses.' 6 ' The main restrictions are that uses must be limited to fifty
years and cannot be wasteful. Other provisions limit the proportions
of groundwater and surface water supplies that can be alienated, pro-
162. Interests in Indian real property cannot be transferred without congressional approval. See
COHEN, supra note 43, at 510-22; The Non-Intercourse Act, 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1982). A contract to
defer use of water rights effectively "leases" rights to others and should come within the restriction on
alienation discussed supra notes 144-146 and accompanying text. See also New Mexico v. Aamodt, 537
F.2d 1102, 1110 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977); United States v. Ahtanum Irriga-
tion Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 334 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 988 (1957).
163. Ute Indian Deferral Agreement of September 20, 1965 (Bureau of Reclamation Contract
No. 14-06-W-194). See also J. FOLK-WILLIAMS, WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS TO THE WEST 88-90
(1982).
164. Supra note 29 and Pub. L. No. 97-293, § 306(c)(2), 96 Stat. 1261, 1280 (1982).
165. Supra note 29.
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vide for notice to the state, and require compliance with state laws on
pipeline construction.
The claims of the Mission Indian bands in Southern California to
waters of the San Luis Rey River are being resolved under an agree-
ment reached after many years of litigation. Under the agreement the
tribes are entitled to 22,700 acre-feet a year of water from the Central
Valley Water Project. 66 The northern California wa:er could be used
on the Indians' land, or all or a portion of it could be sold for off
reservation use. Sales could produce up to $2 million a year for the
tribes, 16 7 while providing seriously needed water to non-Indians in San
Diego County.
Exports of water from Indian reservations may not be limited to
uses in the states where the reservations lie. The value of water to the
tribe is increased if there is an interstate market. The State of Colo-
rado and the Ute Mountain Ute and Southern Ute Indian tribes have
negotiated an agreement to settle the tribes' reserved water rights
claims. The Indians (and the United States on their behalf) insisted
that the tribes not be precluded from marketing their water. The state
concurred with the Indians' request to include nothing in the agree-
ment that specifically bars marketing, even interstate, so long as it
comports with state restrictions on water export and does not run
afoul of the interstate compacts to which the state is a party.' 68 This
provision has aroused opposition among interests in some Lower Col-
orado River Basin states who apparently fear that the agreement and
its possible effect as a precedent may result in their having to compen-
sate tribes for Indian water now available downstream without cost. 1
69
Since the decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska,170 it has been clear
that state laws regulating water export must pass muster under the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. State legislation
must not impede interstate commerce in water, which the Court held
to be a commodity. Only a state's even-handed measures, demanded
by shortages to protect "the health of its citizens-and not simply the
health of its economy," will be allowed to restrict interstate water
markets. 7 ' Therefore, states may not obstruct reasonable economic
transactions in water. Although the Court has not specifically decided
the issue, a legitimate interest in protecting state citizens probably
166. S. 795, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a)(1) (1987); see also supra note 135.
167. S. REP. No. 47, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 79 (1987).
168. Colorado Ute Indian Water Rights Final Settlement Agreement, Art. VI, Sec. A, subsection
I.b., Dec. 10, 1986.
169. See Schmitz, supra note 160.
170. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
171. Id. at 956.
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does not include withholding exports of Indian water so that it will be
available for future use in the state. State restrictions on Indian water
export may be further limited by the Indian Commerce Clause. 72 If
state regulation restrained the use of Indian reservation resources it
would violate an independent barrier to state control of Indians and
their property inherent in the Commerce Clause.
73
By broadening the markets for Indian water, the value of tribal
water can be-increased. Furthermore, non-Indian users who, by virtue
of proximity or geography, can be supplied with water by an Indian
tribe, gain another option for future supply. Non-Indians may achieve
greater certainty of water supplies and remove the threat of possible
interruption of existing uses through negotiation of firm legal arrange-
ments with tribes to continue or expand non-Indian use of water sub-
ject to Indian reserved rights.
CONCLUSION
Indians and non-Indians are in a common quest for enough clean
water to meet their respective needs for sustenance, production, re-
freshment, and spiritual fulfillment. Legal institutions have been used
to drive them apart in that quest.
States and tribal governments can benefit if they join in seeking
optimal solutions to water rights issues through improved manage-
ment and voluntary economic allocation of Indian water. Cooperative
agreements for regulation and management of resources and interjuris-
dictional compacts can ensure wiser, fuller use of water resources and
better protection of water quality. Arms-length marketing arrange-
ments can also be mutually beneficial if they are sensitive to cultural
differences and are the result of a good-faith search for common
ground. Cooperation rather than combat will lead to solving practical
problems with practical solutions, instead of prolonged disputes that
ultimately award one party a paper victory that does not readily trans-
late into "wet water."
Reserved rights claims are traditionally acrimonious in the West.
The late Dean Frank J. Trelease wrote about the typical reactions of
parties to reserved rights claims ten years ago, marveling at the im-
172. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 13 ("The Congress shall have Power to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" (emphasis added).).
173. See COHEN, supra note 43, at 270-279. State control of reservation resources is generally
preempted by the treaties, statutes or executive orders establishing an Indian reservation. E.g., White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980) (state taxation of Indians); Williams v. Lee.
358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) ("absent governing acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them.").
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practicality of approaches then being taken by litigants. Referring to
Cappaert v. United States, a reserved rights case,' 7 4 he said:
I intend to devote my waning energies to real problems like why
the Cappaerts and the United States do not act like ordinary water
users with a protection of diversion problem, and work out a phys-
ical and legal solution that will allow irrigation, yet preserve the
water level [needed by the United States for fish habitat] and, thus,
permit the Cappaerts and the pupfish each to do their thing.
1 75
Litigation and negotiation resulting in quantification and resolu-
tion of various Indian water rights questions have brought tribes and
states to the brink of the kinds of solutions proposed here. The next
step is to breathe meaning and values into those paper rights by using
and managing them wisely. Cooperation in crafting -practical solu-
tions for the mutual benefit of Indians and non-Indians can be fruitful,
and can avoid many of the costs, delays and inconclusiveness of past
approaches to Indian water rights issues.
174. 426 U.S. 128 (1976).
175. Trelease, Federal Reserved Water Rights Since PLLRC, 54 DEN. L.J. 473, 492 (1977).

